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CONFRONTATION AND KABUKI
David Alan Sklansky*
There is an old Jewish joke about a man who takes his
mother to a fancy restaurant and later asks her what she thought
of the meal. “It was fine,” she says, “what there was of it.”
“Were the portions too skimpy?” the son asks. “Oh,” his
mother responds, “there was plenty . . . such as it was.”
Reading the Supreme Court’s recent decision interpreting
and applying the Confrontation Clause can make you feel a little
like the son in that story. You begin to wonder what parts of the
argument deserve to be taken seriously. But the ambiguity isn’t
about quantity versus quality. It has to do with the significance
of original intent.
Beginning with Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme
Court’s confrontation jurisprudence has been famously and quite
explicitly originalist. The Court has insisted that the
Confrontation Clause should be interpreted as it was originally
understood—no matter how inconvenient or unjust the results
may now seem. At the same time, the Court has suggested in its
jurisprudence that the result dictated by an originalist reading of
the Confrontation Clause is not, actually, inconvenient or unjust.
Mirabile dictu, the originalist reading always turns out to be the
best reading on policy grounds as well—the reading, that is to
say, that best promotes what might be thought to be the
underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause while also
taking account of considerations of administrability and
practicality. There is no hard choice, the Court continues to
rediscover, between originalism and pragmatism.
All of this raises questions about how sincere and how
* Yosef Osheawich Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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meaningful it is when the Court appeals to history in its
confrontation decisions. Originalism lacks cash value if it never
leads the Court to results it would otherwise avoid: “[i]f
originalism never requires judges to reach results that they
would not reach using some other theory, it does no independent
work.”2 The extended discussions of common-law precedents in
the confrontation cases begin to look like rhetorical kabuki, a bit
of stylized theater to dress up what are really, at bottom,
arguments about something else entirely.
Were it only so. If debates about original meaning were just
ceremonial, they would do little damage. They would be
irrelevant to the main event, disconnected, like a cartoon before
the feature film. But the rhetorical kabuki in confrontation cases
is more complicated—more like the Jewish mother’s complaints
about the restaurant. It involves shifting repeatedly between two
modes of discourse—one pragmatic and one historical—in a way
that avoids the need for either set of arguments to bear the full
weight of the Court’s conclusions.
To get a feel for the rhetorical back-and-forth, it is helpful to
compare the oral arguments in the Court’s recent confrontation
cases with the opinions later released in these cases. I will do
that in the first part of this essay. (Focusing on oral argument is
a little artificial, of course. What about the briefs? But bear with
me. I will get to them later.) The pattern in the oral arguments
and the decisions is complicated: sometimes the argument
focused on policy and the opinions on history; sometimes the
opposite; sometimes both focused on history; and sometimes
both seemed more concerned with policy. The second part of the
essay will briefly discuss the implications of the rhetorical and
methodological shifts discussed in the first part. There are
advantages, of course, to eclecticism, and well-known reasons
not to obsess about consistency. Sometimes what looks like an
unwillingness to be pinned down is really a sophisticated and
advantageous dialectic. But not always.

2

Louis Michael Seidman, This Essay Is Brilliant/This Essay Is Stupid:
Positive and Negative Self-Reference in Constitutional Practice and Theory,
46 UCLA L. REV. 501, 550 (1998).
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I.
When Crawford was argued before the Justices, common law
hardly came up at all. The Court pressed the lawyers on the
nature and implications of their positions: what precedents would
need to be reconsidered if their arguments were accepted, and
what future cases might come out differently? Crawford’s
counsel referred fleetingly to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.3
The Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the United States as
amicus curiae was also asked about Raleigh, but only in passing,
as the basis for a hypothetical designed to test how far the
government would go in tying admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause to reliability.4 Counsel for the State of
Washington, toward the beginning of his argument, made halting
reference to “the history surrounding the Confrontation Clause
and how we got to have the right to confrontation,” but the
Court did not pursue the matter.5 Virtually all of the Court’s
questions focused on practicalities: how different tests would
operate in practice, what it would mean to depart from or to
adhere to the framework for confrontation analysis set forth in
Ohio v. Roberts6—the framework that the petitioner in Crawford
had asked the Court to reconsider, and that the Court ultimately
abandoned.
The Court did so in an opinion that paid far more attention
3

Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, 56, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No.
02-9410).
4
Id. at 28. Counsel for the United States responded to the inquiry by
saying he “doubt[ed] seriously that . . . Sir Walter Raleigh’s case would
come out differently under our approach.” Id. He meant, presumably, that
the approach the United States was urging the Court to adopt—limiting the
Confrontation Clause to “testimonial statements and their functional
equivalent,” id. at 23—would condemn the outcome in Raleigh’s case, just
like the Court’s traditional approach. He didn’t really mean that Raleigh’s
case would come out the same way it in fact came out, with Raleigh
convicted and sentenced to death based on an out-of-court statement provided
by his alleged co-conspirator. But it is a sign of how little history mattered
during the oral argument of Crawford that no one on the Court bothered to
clarify this.
5
Id. at 37–38.
6
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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to history and to common-law cases than had been paid at oral
argument. The common-law background of the Confrontation
Clause was, in fact, the principal subject of Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court in Crawford: he spent considerably more
pages discussing that history than he spent on the Court’s own
precedents or on how the Roberts test had operated in practice.
Justice Scalia did suggest that Roberts had worked badly: the
results it produced were unpredictable and inconsistent. What
was worst about those results, though, is that they diverged from
the common-law holdings that Justice Scalia suggested the
Confrontation Clause was intended to codify.7 The oral argument
in Crawford was intensely practical in its focus; the Court’s
opinion in Crawford was pointedly historical and originalist.
Two years after deciding Crawford, the Court returned to the
Confrontation Clause in a pair of cases consolidated for oral
argument and decision, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana.8 The lawyers took their cues from Crawford, and
common law received a fair bit of attention in the oral
arguments of these two cases. Counsel for Davis discussed the
treatment of “hue and cry” reports in the seventeenth century.9
The Solicitor General’s office, appearing again as amicus curiae,
said that a 911 call—the evidence at issue in Davis—differed
from a Marian examination.10 Both Justice Breyer and Justice
Scalia asked the Deputy Solicitor General about a set of
seventeenth-century “hue and cry” cases relied upon by Davis.
These cases suggested that reports of ongoing crimes to law
enforcement officers were not admissible.11 Justice Scalia
invoked Raleigh’s case when questioning counsel for the State of
12
Washington. The lawyer for Washington, in turn, tried to focus
the Court on whether introducing evidence from a 911 call
“resemble[d] . . . inquisitorial abuses.”13 Counsel for Hammon
7

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5, 63–65.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
9
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 56–58, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No.
05-5224).
10
Id. at 43.
11
Id. at 49–50.
12
Id. at 29.
13
Id. at 31–32.
8
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discussed Old Bailey cases14 and the limited development of
hearsay law in the eighteenth century.15 Counsel for Indiana
dealt at length with Raleigh’s case, examinations by Marian
magistrates, and the light these abuses shed on what “the
Founders were concerned about”; his point was that questioning
by police officers at the scene of a domestic disturbance—the
context of the statements at issue in Hammon—differed from the
kinds of things the Confrontation Clause was intended to
prohibit.16 On the other hand, counsel for the United States,
appearing as amicus curiae in Hammon, did not mention history
or common law. His entire argument, and all of the questions
the Court put to him, concerned the workability of a definition
of “testimonial” that excluded statements obtained “in response
to police questions that are reasonably necessary to determine
whether an emergency exists.”17 This was the focus of the
rebuttal argument by Hammon’s lawyer, too, but he couched it
in terms of keeping “the confrontation right . . . robust, as the
Framers intended.”18 All in all, history and common law played
a much larger role in the Davis and Hammon arguments than
they had when Crawford was argued before the Court. In fact,
Indiana’s Solicitor General told the Court that the “important
lesson from Crawford” was that in interpreting the
Confrontation Clause the question should be “[w]hat does
history tell us the Founders were concerned about?”19
The Court pushed back. Justice Scalia, who wrote the
Court’s opinions in Crawford, Davis, and Hammon, cautioned at
oral argument against “overread[ing] Crawford” by concluding
“that the only thing the Confrontation Clause was directed at was
the kind of abuse that . . . occurred in the case of Sir Walter
14

Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813
(2006) (No. 05-5705).
15
Id. at 20.
16
Id. at 31–34, 36–39, 44–48.
17
Id. at 48–59.
18
Id. at 61; see also id. at 62–63 (suggesting that the questioning in
Hammon “resembled inquisitorial practices . . . in a key respect” and that the
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause should take into account “the
system of private prosecution” in place when the Bill of Rights was adopted).
19
Id. at 31.
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Raleigh.”20 It would be “the worst sort of formalism,” Justice
Scalia suggested, to make admissibility of a statement hinge on
how closely it resembled the evidence produced in a Marian
examination.21 And the Court pushed back when deciding these
cases, too. Justice Thomas reasoned that neither a 911 call nor
police questioning at the scene of a domestic disturbance
sufficiently resembled a Marian examination to be barred by the
Confrontation Clause: there was no “formalized dialog,” there
were no Miranda warnings, the declarants were not in custody,
there were no other “indicia of formality,” and there was “no
suggestion that the prosecution attempted to offer the . . . hearsay
evidence at trial in order to evade confrontation.”22 But Justice
Thomas wrote for himself and in partial dissent. Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the majority cited some eighteenth-century (and
nineteenth-century) cases, but mostly in support of the notion that
the Confrontation Clause applied only to “testimonial” statements,
and not for aid in determining what a testimonial statement was—
or whether, in particular, a 911 call or police questioning at the
scene of a domestic disturbance counted as testimonial.23 On those
questions, the Court relied mostly on arguments about what kind
of rule would be sensible and would fit well with the basic idea
that a statement was “testimonial” if it was a “substitute for live
testimony.”24 Responding to Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
reasoned that “[i]t imports sufficient formality . . . that lies to
[police] officers are criminal offenses.”25 But that argument was
plainly makeshift. The real point was that, in Justice Scalia’s
words, “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its
26
extinction.”
Giles v. California,27 argued to the Court two years after
20

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32–33.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 35.
22
Davis, 547 U.S. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
23
See id. at 824–25 & n.3 (majority opinion).
24
Id. at 830.
25
Id. at 830 n.5.
26
Id.
27
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
21
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Davis and Hammon, also concerned statements made to police
officers responding to a call about domestic violence. Giles was
charged with murdering his former girlfriend, who had told the
police three weeks earlier that Giles had attacked her and
threatened to kill her. The question was whether the
Confrontation Clause barred the introduction of the out-of-court
statements even if the judge concluded that, as the indictment
charged, the declarant’s unavailability was due to the
defendant’s wrongdoing. Everyone agreed that there was an
equitable forfeiture exception to the confrontation requirement,
but the defendant claimed that it should be limited to cases
where the wrongdoing was aimed at preventing the declarant
from testifying in court. Oral argument in Giles focused heavily
on common-law history: the question that received the most
attention was whether pre-1791 common-law courts would have
admitted out-of-court accusations on the ground that the
defendant had procured the accuser’s absence, even though there
was no proof that the defendant had been motivated by a desire
to prevent the accuser from testifying.28 Counsel for Giles—and
Justice Scalia—repeatedly claimed that there were no commonlaw cases directly supporting that proposition,29 and counsel for
the State of California did not disagree; his claim was simply
that the logic of the common law suggested these accusations
would apply even when no intent to prevent testimony was
shown.30
If the parties in Giles concurred that the resolution of the
case should turn on eighteenth-century understandings, not
everyone else was convinced. Professor Richard Friedman, who
had argued for the defendant in Hammon, filed an amicus brief
supporting the State of California in Giles; he wanted the Court
to interpret the confrontation right in a way “that recognizes the
importance of the right in our system of criminal justice and at
the same time is practical in administration and does not unduly

28

See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Giles, 554 U.S. 353
(2008) (No. 07-6053).
29
See id. at 8, 20, 25, 33.
30
See, e.g., id. at 34–35, 38–40.
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hamper prosecution of crime.”31 At oral argument in Giles,
moreover, Justice Breyer tried to get California’s lawyer to
argue that “maybe we shouldn’t follow completely the common
law” as it existed in 1791: “maybe we have to assume an intent
to allow the Confrontation Clause to evolve as the law of
evidence itself evolves.”32 But even California’s lawyer would
not go that far; the most he would suggest is that the Court
should “take account . . . of situations that the common law
might not have faced or might not have recognized as
representing a problem of relevant evidence to a crime.”33
The decision in Giles was as originalist as the argument. The
Court reaffirmed what it had said in Crawford—that the
Confrontation Clause should be read “as a reference to the right
of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding”34—and, for once, was
willing to start and end with common law . . . almost. Toward
the end of his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia suggested
there would be an uncomfortable element of bootstrapping in
admitting an out-of-court accusation against a murder defendant
by the defendant’s alleged victim on the ground that the judge
believed the defendant was guilty of murdering the victim. But
this was something of a digression, intended to cast doubt on the
suggestion that a broad rule of forfeiture would make more
sense than a narrower rule tied to a purpose behind the
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.35 The vast bulk of Justice
Scalia’s opinion was devoted to an inquiry into the bounds of the
forfeiture exception at common law before the Confrontation
Clause was adopted. He was openly scornful, in fact, of the
suggestion that the Court could recognize new exceptions to the
confrontation requirement based on the underlying objective of
36
the right. He lost his majority on this point. Justice Souter and
31

Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 2, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (No. 07-6053).
32
Transcript of Oral Argument, Giles, supra note 28, at 34–35.
33
Id. at 35.
34
Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 54 (2004)).
35
Id. at 374.
36
See id.
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Justice Ginsburg joined all but that part of Justice Scalia’s
opinion, and Justice Souter wrote a short concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, that put more weight on the
undesirability of a broader rule of forfeiture.37
Moreover, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
Kennedy, argued in dissent in Giles that practicalities weighed
heavily against the rule adopted by the Court. The dissenters
thought that the right to confrontation should be forfeited whenever
the witness’s unavailability was due to the defendant’s misconduct,
regardless of what the defendant’s purpose had been in killing the
witness or otherwise making her unavailable. The dissenters argued
that the most “conclusive” justifications for their position included
considerations of policy and the “basic purposes and objectives” of
the confrontation right.38 Nonetheless, even the dissenters felt
compelled to argue at length about how the forfeiture question
would be resolved under “17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century law of
evidence.”39 And two of the justices in the majority signaled an
inclination to take originalism even further than Justice Scalia.
Justice Thomas wrote separately to reiterate the view he had
expressed in Davis, that the Confrontation Clause applied only to
statements made in a context “sufficiently formal to resemble the
Marian examinations.”40 Justice Alito said that he, too, was “not
convinced that the out-of-court statement at issue [in Giles] fell
within the Confrontation Clause in the first place”; but he joined
the majority’s analysis because the State of California had conceded
that question.41 On the whole, therefore, the opinions in Giles were
highly originalist, just as the argument in that case had been.
The Court returned to the Confrontation Clause the following
42
year in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. The question was
whether prosecutors could introduce a sworn certificate of
examination from a state forensic chemist who did not testify
37

Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 384, 403 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 390.
40
Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
41
Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring).
42
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
38
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and was not subject to cross-examination; the Court concluded
this practice was unconstitutional. Unlike the oral argument in
Giles, the oral argument in Melendez-Diaz was highly focused
on present-day concerns. History took a back seat. Justice
Breyer, who had dissented in Giles, made plain at the MelendezDiaz oral argument that he was less interested in “what
happened in the year 1084” than in “what’s a workable rule.”43
Justice Scalia, in contrast, said that he was “interested in the
history,” because the point of Crawford was “that the content of
the Confrontation Clause is not what we would like it to be, but
what it historically was when it was enshrined in the
Constitution.”44 But none of the other Justices seemed terribly
interested in history at the oral argument; the bulk of the
questioning—including most of Justice Scalia’s questions—
focused on practicalities: how a rule could be formulated, what
incentives it would create for lawyers and their clients, and how
burdensome it would be for the government. Counsel for the
defendant—Professor Jeffrey Fisher, who had also represented
the defendants in Crawford and in Davis—made no effort to
steer the discussion back to history and common law. The
Attorney General of Massachusetts began her argument for the
State by asserting that the certificates at issue were “official
records” of “independently verifiable facts” and therefore would
have been “admissible at common law.”45 A few minutes later
Justice Souter and then Justice Scalia pressed her on that claim,
but only briefly.46 The questioning quickly returned to questions
of administrability, feasibility, the nature of scientific testing,
and the underlying purposes of the confrontation right. This also
was the predominant focus of the questioning of the United
47
States Assistant Solicitor General, appearing as amicus curiae.
The Court split 5-4 in Melendez-Diaz. Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority, striking down the Massachusetts practice of
43

Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(No. 07-591).
44
Id. at 23.
45
Id. at 29.
46
Id. at 33–34.
47
Id. at 48–58.
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allowing prosecutors to rely on sworn certificates of analysis
from chemists who never appeared in court or were subject to
cross-examination. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Breyer, wrote a sharp dissent,
complaining that confrontation doctrine was becoming
“formalistic,” “wooden,” and “pointless.”48 Both opinions
appealed to pre-1791 common law but spent more time debating
whether it made sense to distinguish scientific analysts from
what Justice Kennedy called “ordinary,” “conventional”
witnesses, who have “personal knowledge of some aspect of the
defendant’s guilt.”49 The dissent argued that extending the
confrontation right to scientific analysts gave defendants a
“windfall . . . unjustified by any demonstrated deficiency in
trials” and would cause widespread disruption of forensic
investigations and criminal prosecutions.50 Justice Kennedy
contended that framing-era common law supported exempting
lab analysts from the Confrontation Clause. He analogized
forensic scientists to copyists, whose affidavits that their copies
were true and accurate “were accepted without hesitation” by
common-law courts, even when the affidavits were prepared
specifically for use in a criminal prosecution.51 But this was a
relatively small part of his argument. Most of his argument had
to do with what kind of rule made most sense on grounds of
policy, balancing the defendant’s legitimate interests against the
burdens placed on courts, prosecutors, and analysts.
Perhaps as a consequence, Justice Scalia devoted much of his
majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz to arguing that giving
defendants a right to confront forensic analysts in court would
be neither disruptive nor prohibitively expensive, and that the
confrontation would help defendants protect themselves against
fraudulent, misleading, or mistaken laboratory results. He also
spent time arguing about common-law precedents, maintaining
that the closest analogs to forensic lab reports at common law
were not copyists’ affidavits but “a clerk’s certificate attesting to
48
49
50
51

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544, 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2543.
Id. at 2549–50.
Id. at 2552–53.
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the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant
record and failed to find it”—certificates that Justice Scalia said
were admissible only if the clerk was “subject to
confrontation.”52 But the points on which Justice Scalia placed
most emphasis in Melendez-Diaz—the points with which he
began his opinion for the Court and the points to which he
returned at the end of the opinion—had to do with what Justice
Scalia took to be the basic logic of Crawford, that statements
prepared as substitutes for testimony cannot be admitted against
a criminal defendant without an opportunity for confrontation.53
The Court’s most recent confrontation cases are Michigan v.
Bryant54 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,55 each of which was
argued and decided in the October 2010 term. The question in
Bryant was whether Crawford and Davis allowed the
introduction in a homicide trial of statements the victim made
after he was shot to police officers who responded to the scene
(the Court answered yes); the question in Bullcoming was
whether Melendez-Diaz permitted the prosecution to introduce a
forensic report based on machine-generated lab results if the
analyst who prepared the report did not appear in court, but
another analyst from the laboratory did (the Court said no).
Aside from scattered references to the prosecution of Sir Walter
Raleigh when Bryant was argued before the Court,56 common
law played little role in the oral argument of either of these
cases. Professor Jeffrey Fisher, representing Bullcoming, started
his oral argument by appealing to the “text, purpose, and history
of the Confrontation Clause,”57 but then spent virtually all of his
time arguing how the purposes of the confrontation guarantee
could best be furthered and a workable and administrable
doctrinal line drawn. This was the focus of the argument in
Bryant as well, notwithstanding the references to Raleigh’s case.
52

Id. at 2539 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2531–32, 2542.
54
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
55
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
56
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, 32, 36, 49, Bryant, 131 S. Ct.
1143 (No. 09-150).
57
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No.
09-10876).
53
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Common law was a minor theme of the opinions in these
cases, too. Perhaps this was because these were the first
significant confrontation cases the Court has decided since
Crawford in which Justice Scalia did not write for the Court.
Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion in Bryant, and
Justice Scalia was in dissent. Justice Scalia was part of the
majority in Bullcoming, but Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court’s
opinion. Even Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Bryant,
though, focused more on the purposes of the confrontation
guarantee, and the administrability of the line drawn by the
Court, than on the intricacies of pre-1791 common law. This
was also the focus of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in
Bullcoming, which Justice Scalia joined.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a short, separate dissent in Bryant.
She agreed with Justice Scalia that the victim’s statements in that
case were “testimonial” and therefore the Court was wrong to
find them admissible without confrontation. Justice Ginsburg
also drew attention, though, to the fact that pre-1791 common
law allowed certain “dying declarations” to be admitted against
homicide defendants, notwithstanding the absence of
confrontation. That issue had not been preserved by the
prosecutors in Bryant, but Justice Ginsburg suggested that in a
case where the issue had been preserved, the Court should
consider whether the Confrontation Clause incorporated the
“dying declaration” exception and what its contours were.58
Nonetheless, for Justice Ginsburg as for the rest of the Court,
the major concerns in Bryant and Bullcoming seemed to be
doctrinal and pragmatic, not historical.
II.
Crawford was argued looking forwards and decided looking
backwards. Davis and Hammon were argued looking backwards
and decided looking forwards. Giles was argued looking
58

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court had
suggested in Giles, and in Crawford itself, that the “dying declaration”
exception might indeed be incorporated into the constitutional guarantee of
confrontation. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 362 (2008);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
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backwards and decided looking backwards. Melendez-Diaz was
argued looking forwards, mainly, and decided looking forwards,
mainly. So were Bryant and Bullcoming, only more so.
Sometimes the advocates focus on common law, sometimes on
concerns of practicality, administrability, and fundamental
purposes. The same goes for the Court. Sometimes the lawyers
are on the same page as the Justices, sometimes not.
All of this might be thought unremarkable. Everyone knows
that judging is an eclectic enterprise, combining attention to
prior decisions and drafters’ intentions with assessments of
workability, social costs and benefits, and underlying rationales.
It is to be expected that certain of these considerations will
receive greater emphasis at one time, other considerations at
another time.
Besides, it oversimplifies matters to look only at oral
arguments. Each of the Court’s recent confrontation cases was
briefed not just by the parties but by amici, and the briefs
reliably argued from a range of perspectives. In each of these
cases, some briefs gave close attention to history and common
law, others raised arguments about the underlying purpose of
confrontation, and still others focused on concerns of practicality
and administrability. Most of the briefs, of course, were
themselves eclectic in the kinds of arguments they raised.
So one way to understand the nature of the argumentation in
the confrontation cases is this: lots of different kinds of
arguments were made in each case, some backward-looking and
some forward-looking. Inevitably, certain arguments wound up
getting a disproportionate amount of attention at oral argument.
There is a limited amount of time for oral argument, and the
entire range of considerations raised in the briefs cannot be
canvassed. So the questioning winds up focusing on arguments
that, for one reason or another, strike one or more Justices as
particularly strong, particularly weak, particularly confusing, or
particularly interesting. Those may or may not wind up being
the points on which the Court leans most heavily when deciding
the case. But just because a consideration gets less emphasis at
oral argument, or in the Court’s written decision, does not mean
the Court is neglecting it. There is a dialectic in these cases, as
in all cases the Court decides: a back-and-forth consideration of,
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say, history on the one hand and policy on the other. There is
nothing nefarious or troubling about the fact that different kinds
of arguments seem more compelling, or more worthy of
discussion, in different cases or at different times.
In fact, the process can be advantageous: policy
considerations and appeals to history can operate as useful
checks on each other. That is one way to read the progression
from Crawford to Davis: the Court confronted what Crawford’s
originalism would look like if taken to an extreme, and (except
for Justice Thomas) refused to go that far. Instead, a majority of
the Court, led by Justice Scalia, seemed to decide in Davis that
the Confrontation Clause needed to be read with enough
flexibility to keep it relevant.
But much, if not most, of the methodological back-and-forth
in the recent confrontation cases has operated less helpfully. It
has taken the form of a kind of rhetorical kabuki, making the
Court’s reasoning harder to pin down, harder to argue with,
harder—in a word—to confront. The Court claims that it is
bound by the original understanding of the Confrontation
Clause, that the clause was originally understood to codify
eighteenth-century common law, and that therefore the Court
must follow the rules of eighteenth-century common law, no
matter how inconvenient or unjust those rules may now seem.
That way of framing the issues suggests that inquiries into
fairness and practicality are irrelevant, except perhaps as
evidence about what eighteenth-century common law is likely to
have required. But the Court repeatedly acts as though fairness
and practicality matter in their own right. Indeed, the Court
often acts—especially at oral argument—as though fairness and
practicality are what matter most. Sometimes common law
trumps considerations of policy, but sometimes it seems to be
the other way around.
It is possible, of course, that the Court has consistently taken
account of both original intent and present-day practicalities
when interpreting the Confrontation Clause. Perhaps the Court
has tried, in each of its recent confrontation cases, to read the
Sixth Amendment in a way that strikes a kind of equilibrium
between historical fidelity and its own assessment of the dictates
of fairness and practicality. There might not be anything wrong
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with that. Lots of people think that the Court should, and maybe
even must, approach the Constitution in this way: balancing
different methodologies against each other, sacrificing purity for
a rough, incompletely theorized kind of common sense. Other
people, including at times some members of the Court, are
skeptical of that kind of multi-factored analysis, finding it too
manipulable and indeterminate.
But that debate can be put to one side. Regardless of whether
it makes sense for the Court to try to balance originalism and
pragmatism on a case-by-case basis, there is little to be said for
making the attempt and not admitting it. If you say that history
matters, but that fairness and accuracy matter, too, and that both
kinds of considerations will be taken into account, then you can
no longer dismiss considerations of either kind as ultimately
beside the point. You can be held responsible, too, for the
particular way in which you combine considerations of history
with considerations of present-day practicalities. And you
commit yourself to defending your interpretative methods in all
of their particulars: your reliance on history (to whatever degree
you rely on it, and in whatever manner), the weight you put on
considerations of justice, fairness, and practicality, and the way
in which you combine these disparate considerations and—
crucially—resolve any conflicts between them. If, on the other
hand, you insist at times that what really matters is history, and
you act at other times as though what really matters is presentday practicality, then you brush aside arguments about history
by talking about fairness and what makes sense, and you belittle
arguments about fairness and what makes sense by retreating to
history. The food was fine, what there was of it; there was
plenty, such as it was.

